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Abstract
Traffic Pumping attacks are a form of high-volume
SPAM that target telephone networks, defraud customers
and squander telephony resources. One type of call in
these attacks is characterized by very low-amplitude signal
levels, notably below the auditory threshold. We propose a
technique to classify so-called “dead air” or “silent” SPAM
calls based on features derived from factorizing the caller
audio spectrogram. We describe the algorithms for feature
extraction and classification as well as our data collection
methods and production performance on millions of calls
per week.
Index Terms: audio spectrogram, matrix factorization,
random forests, spam over ip telephony
1 Introduction
The Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) is a
collection of interconnected telephone networks that abide
by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) stan-
dards allowing telephones to intercommunicate. In re-
cent decades, telephone service providers have modernized
their network infrastructure to Voice over Internet Proto-
col (VoIP) to take advantage of the availability of equip-
ment, lower operating costs and increased capacity to pro-
vide voice communication and multimedia sessions. These
advances also make it easy to automate the distribution
of unsolicited and infelicitous call traffic colorfully known
as robocalling or SPam over Internet Telephony (SPIT)
[28, 15]. For a comprehensive background on the ecosys-
tem, pervasiveness of telephone SPAM, the various actors
and the impact to consumers, refer to [20, 26].
Traffic Pumping (TP) is one class of robocall that starts
when small, usually rural, Local Exchange Carriers (LXC)
partner with telephone service providers (typically with toll-
free numbers) to route the latter’s calls. The LXC flood
their own telephone networks with call traffic to boost their
call volume and the inter-carrier revenue-sharing fees they
are owed by long-distance, cross-regional Interexchange
Carriers (IXC), per the Telecommunications Act of 1996
[29, 5]. Confusing matters further, in the call-routing chain
each carrier only sees the preceding and following carrier.
Therefore, no single player has the full route back to the
spammer, which complicates provenance tracking and com-
pletely stopping TP [4].
The telephony stack behind the Marchex call and speech
analytics business handles over one million calls per busi-
ness day, or decades of encrypted audio recordings per week
[23]. This volume makes our telephony stack particularly
susceptible to attempts to anonymously establish automated
voice sessions. TP caller audio has a number of different
qualitative characteristics, it may be recordings (e.g. a sec-
tion of an audio-book or music), broadband noise or signal-
ing tones (e.g. busy, ring, fax, modem). The caller audio
may also simply be “dead air”, where no one answers and
there is no audible sound. By this, we do not suggest digital
silence, but very low level signal levels below the thresh-
old of audibility. Developing countermeasures for this latter
category of “silent” signal is focus of this report.
Effectively mitigating TP is an adversarial match with
the spammer. As countermeasures are deployed, spammers
are motivated to find new means to dynamically evade.
Inbound calls also require immediate attention, which at
scale introduces real-time constraints on SPAM classifiers.
We contrast this with email SPAM mitigation which can
often be deferred for future analysis offline. Finally, our
call based business requires very high accuracy, as false
positives, i.e. mistakenly blocked calls, are detrimental to
our customers [20].
The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We propose a novel countermeasure for “dead air” VoIP
SPAM using features derived from the Singular Value
Decomposition (SVD) of the audio spectrogram.
• Given the first two seconds of a call, we demonstrate the
efficacy of a Random Forest classifier trained on these
features to classify SPAM at production scale.
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This paper is organized as follows, Section 2 briefly summa-
rizes related work mitigating SPAM. Section 3 details the
algorithms for audio feature extraction. Section 4 describes
our use of Random Forests for classification. Section 5 and
6 detail our experiments and results, while Section 7 discuss
our post-attack experiments. Section 8 concludes with ideas
for future work.
2 Related Work
VoIP SPAM countermeasures broadly fall into two cat-
egories. The first involves the use of Call Request Header
(CRH) metadata e.g. Caller ID or caller’s terminal device,
in concert with white and black lists. Previous behavior
and reputation systems also use Caller ID to track behavior
and reputation scores. However CRH metadata is not al-
ways present nor reliably propagated while Caller ID num-
bers can be easily and cheaply falsified with open-source
VoIP PBX systems such as Asterix PBX or FreeSWITCH
[27, 21].
The second approach involves training machine-learned
models to classify calls based on telephony control signal
features or the call audio itself. When the call audio is based
on a recording, landmark-based audio fingerprinting (e.g.
music-id app Shazam) is commonly used for identification
[6, 24]. Acoustic pattern analysis features include voice-
codec signatures, {VoIP vs. PSTN} packet loss patterns or
channel noise-profiles [1, 20]. These systems are often cou-
pled with interactive challenge-response tests (e.g. Audio-
CAPTCHAs or Interactive voice response (IVR) “Turing
tests”) to further verify the identity of suspicious callers and
minimize false positives.
For our specific task with “dead air” audio, we know
of only one related effort, which focused on mobile de-
vice identification using Mel-frequency cepstral coefficients
(MFCC) features. To account for the absence of an audible
speech signal, Jahanirad et al. computed the entropy of the
Mel-cepstrum, discovering that sections of “silent” signal
resulted in high-valued entropy-MFCC features which were
effective in discriminating between different mobile device
models [8]. This work suggests there are characteristic fea-
tures of a source device or the transmission channel even in
the absence of a speech signal.
3 Feature Extraction
In telephony audio, background noise levels can have a
fair amount of energy, so simple energy heuristics do not ef-
fectively identify “silence”. This observation informed in-
vestigations beyond simple activity detection models. The
mission was now to find discriminable features given the
first two seconds of a “silent” call. This short duration was
chosen because it can fit within the cadence of an extra ring-
ing tone. Analyses of the audio revealed no dominant har-
monicity, fundamental frequencies nor reliable temporal en-
velope descriptions. Zero crossing and spectral shape statis-
tics required a minimum signal level above the noise-floor
to be of any use as an input to a machine learning classifier
[8]. In other words, peak levels at -50 dBFS and average
levels around -72 dbFS in our 16-bit system corresponded
to a very low dynamic range and a minimum signal-to-noise
ratio, which limited the signal analysis options.
3.1 Spectrogram Representation
Spectrograms are two dimensional representations of se-
quences of frequency spectra with time along the horizon-
tal axis and frequency along the vertical. The color and/or
brightness illustrates the magnitude of the frequency k at
time-frame n. A spectrogram compactly addresses the need
to represent a sequence of audio features over the two sec-
ond duration required for the task. Empirically, they are a
practical choice, possessing more information that any sin-
gle audio feature investigated above, but with lower dimen-
sionality than the time domain waveform [30].
To compute the spectrogram, we decode the first two
seconds of mono 8kHz µ-law audio from our VoIP PBX
to 16-bit PCM and then use a Short Time Fourier Trans-
form (STFT) to compute the complex-valued spectrogram
Sc(n, k) with n and k as the time-frame and frequency bin
indices respectively:
Sc(n, k) =
W
2 −1∑
l=−W2
w(l) · x(l + nh) · e−2piilk/W (1)
To compute the STFT, the audio signal x(n) is sliced into
overlapping segments of equal length, W samples wide.
Each segment is offset in time by a hop size value h. A
Hann or raised-cosine window w(l) is multiplied element-
wise with each segment. This “windowing” acts a taper-
ing function to reduce spectral leakage during Fast Fourier
Transforms (FFT) [11]. Finally, an FFT of size W is com-
puted separately on each windowed waveform segment to
generate a complex spectrogram [17]. The magnitude spec-
trogram X(n, k) is the complex modulus of Sc(n, k).
X(n, k) = |Sc(n, k)| (2)
For a complex number z, its complex modulus is defined as
|z| =
√
x2 + y2, where x and y denote the real and imag-
inary parts respectively. We compute the magnitude spec-
trogram rather than the power or mel-spectrogram, as we
observed that the dynamic scale of the magnitude represen-
tation better suited to low-intensity signals [22].
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3.2 Spectrogram Decomposition
Spectrogram factorization has been widely used for its
flexibility modeling compositional mixtures of sounds from
disparate sources. Applications include source separa-
tion [18], music information retrieval, environmental sound
classification [25], instrument timbre classification [10],
drum transcription [13], de-reverberation [9] and noise-
robust speaker recognition [7].
Because we are strictly looking to classify, not recover
entire components, we conceptualize the “silent” audio
magnitude spectrogram as an additive mixture of spectral
basis vectors corresponding to various source and trans-
mission channel factors. We represent constituent elements
thusly, in both frequency and time, assuming that only the
scale of each spectral basis is time-variant [16].
There are different decompositions of a matrix based on
its properties, e.g. square vs. rectangular, symmetric, non
negative elements or positive eigenvalues. In applications
where mixtures of sounds sources in multicomponent sig-
nals are modeled by their distribution of time/frequency en-
ergy, latent sources are recovered using Principal compo-
nent analysis (PCA). This is accomplished by a singular
value or eigen-decomposition of the autocorrelation matrix,
XXT of the spectrogram X [13].
On the magnitude spectrogram, we use the Singular
Value Decomposition (SVD) because it yields a “deeper”
factorization and produces unique factors. Additionally,
singular values are useful in understanding the most impor-
tant spectral bases [2]. The SVD of an n×m matrix X is
the factorization of X into the product of three matrices:
X = UDV T (3)
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where the columns of the n×d matrix U and the m×d ma-
trix V consist of the left and right singular vectors, respec-
tively. D is a d×d diagonal matrix whose diagonal entries
are the singular values of X , representing the “strength” of
each spectral basis.
4 Classification
To classify spectral bases feature vectors from U , we
trained a Random Forest (RF) classifier. The latter is an en-
semble learning method for supervised classification tasks.
Ensembles are a divide-and-conquer approach where a
group of “weak learners” band together to form a “stronger
Figure 1. Log-frequency Power Spectrogram of first two
seconds of a TP “silent” call. Power Spectrogram plotted
for visualization
learner”. RFs arise from a machine learning modeling tech-
nique called a decision tree, i.e. our weak learner. For clas-
sification, decision trees make predictions based on obser-
vations about the feature data, represented by the branches,
to judgements about the data’s class, represented by the
leaves.
RFs work by constructing a multitude of random deci-
sion trees during training, yielding the class that is the mode
of all the classes. To classify new objects from an input fea-
ture vector, the latter is processed by each tree, which gives
a classification or “vote” for a particular class. The forest
chooses the classification with the most votes among all the
trees in the forest.
RFs are a good choice for our task because of superb ac-
curacy on datasets of different sizes. They also less prone
to balance error in the case that there are imbalances in the
number of training examples for each class. In our case we
have a lot more HAM1 than SPAM. We also considered how
well they generalize (i.e. do not overfit) and their compu-
tational performance during prediction [3]. In contrast to
linear support vector machine classifiers, see Figures 2-4,
with RFs we were able to obtain good precision and busi-
ness acceptable recall.
5 Experiments
During a TP attack, an extra 10,000 to 33,000 “silent”
calls per day may be handled by the telephony stack. Busi-
ness requirements specified that two seconds was the maxi-
mum permissible latency for this category of SPAM analy-
sis before bridging calls. To label calls:
• We enabled the call processors to write the first two sec-
onds of audio data to disk during the collection period.
1HAM are desirable calls, in contrast to SPAM
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Each audio file was named with a unique call-id.
• We used a metric called Caller Speech (CS) emitted by
the Voice Activity Detector (VAD) in our downstream
ASR system [23] to find call-ids with zero Caller
Speech.
This latter metric tracks the number of times the VAD
activates to capture caller utterances. For “dead air” calls,
this value was always zero. Because we compute CS after
the call has ended, this technique was only useful to select
calls for labeling training data.
We collected 8,000 calls during one day during the at-
tack, filtering calls that failed the IVR Turing test in concert
with zero CS fields, we were able to quickly and definitively
label 256 “silent” SPAM calls. Another 692 failed the IVR
test and had null CS values, but exhibited the same “dead”
air features upon manual inspection. We also labeled 1,500
calls with positive CS values that successfully passed the
IVR test.
For feature extraction, we used the Python frameworks,
numpy and librosa [12]. For classification, we used the
scikit-learn RandomForestClassifier [14], trained
for 100 iterations on the top 3 bases of U (Section 3.2).
For cross validation, we used a stratified shuffle split cross-
validator over the total number of trees, i.e. the data is shuf-
fled each time, before a new train/test split is generated. Re-
fer to Figure 2.
To establish a baseline performance with other classi-
fiers, we experimented with two other linear models in
scikit-learn, see Table 1. The first is the Linear Support Vec-
tor Classification, LinearSVC, which uses a liblinear
implementation that penalizes the intercept and minimizes
the squared hinge loss. The second is SGDClassifier
which optimizes the same cost function as LinearSVC
but with the hinge loss and stochastic gradient descent in
lieu of exact gradient descent. While both are linear kernel
methods, the first is optimized to scale to a large number of
samples, while the second supports minibatch training and
may generalize better [14].
6 Initial Results
Evaluating the system performance entails comparing
the model’s predicted value to ground truth. There are four
possible outcomes of the system’s performance: A True
Positive (TP) is a correct SPAM prediction, a True Negative
(TN) is a correct HAM prediction. A False Positive (FP) is
an incorrect SPAM prediction, a False Negative (FN) is a
incorrect HAM classification, i.e. an actual SPAM call was
able to get through.
Precision, also known as positive predictive value, is the
percentage of positive SPAM classifications that were ac-
tually SPAM. Intuitively, precision tells us how correct the
Figure 2. Stratified shuffle split cross-validation re-
sults over the number of trees in the forest for
RandomForestClassifier
classifier is when it predicts that a call is SPAM. Precision
suffers as the number of FPs grow. Similarly, recall, also
called sensitivity, tells us how many of the positive cases
did the classifier get from the total number of positive cases.
Recall suffers as the number of FNs grow. Accuracy is the
proportion of correctly identified calls (TP + TN) to all calls.
Precision =
TP
TP + FP
(4)
Recall =
TP
TP + FN
(5)
From a high-volume business perspective, it is much less
egregious to let in the occasional SPAM call (FN), than it is
to label and reject legitimate calls as SPAM (FP). In other
words, high precision (low FPs) is more important than high
recall (low FNs).
Model Precision Recall Accuracy
Linear SVC 58.57 63.60 84.04
Linear SVC with SGD 81.85 52.56 76.31
Random Forest 83.82 63.27 90.40
Table 1. Classifier performance
In examining the precision and recall figures from cross-
validation, a model of 100 trees was chosen for production
to foremost optimize precision (84%) and overall accuracy
(90%). This practical choice was also influenced by our
recognition of the limits and biases of our small and class
imbalanced dataset.
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As the realtime and low-latency requirements for classi-
fication across thousands of concurrent calls made any kind
of manual verification very impractical, to further minimize
hanging up on real customers (FPs), we introduce the minor
inconvenience of an IVR Turing test for all positive SPAM
predictions, requiring callers to press a randomly chosen
numeric key to proceed. Calls that do not make it past the
IVR are labeled as REJECTED CALLER SILENCE in the
production call-log.
Figure 3. Stratified shuffle split cross-validation results
over the regularization term alpha, for SGDClassifier,
an SVM classifier with SGD training
7 Post-Attack Experiments
The nature of TP attacks is such that they are high inten-
sity over a short period of time, from days to weeks, after
which SPAM levels subside, returning to a “steady-state”
or low-grade level. This reduction could be externally mo-
tivated or in response to our blocking efforts. After this
“dead air” attack abated, to re-evaluate the performance of
the classifier and understand any new characteristics of the
low-prevalence SPAM, we captured a full day of audio from
calls on a single production host, some 69,900 calls.
Of these, 3,096 were marked as a kind of SPAM (not just
“silent”) by the classifiers on that host. Cross-referencing
these calls with call-stack metadata gave us 968 confirmed
calls for which we had both audio and a metadata tag of
SPAM that had been rejected (i.e. the call-stack hung up
or the call failed IVR Turing test). Table 2 lists the preva-
lence of different kinds of SPAM, with “silent” SPAM in
boldface.
After matching 968 rejected calls, we were left with
2,128 calls which were not rejected by the call-stack, all
Figure 4. Stratified shuffle split cross-validation results
over the penalty parameter C, for a LinearSVC
Spam Type Count
CALLER FAX 611
CALLER SILENCE 233
CALLER RECORDING 87
CALLER NOISE 32
CALLER BUSY 5
Total 968
Table 2. Prevalence of SPAM types in 968 post-attack calls
captured on one host
of which were classified by our model as “silent” SPAM.
This extremely high count of predicted “silent” SPAM calls
suggested a very high FP rate and that our error analysis
was far from complete.
Tabulating the call result metadata for each of the 2,128
predicted “silent” calls revealed a variety of outcomes, other
than failing to pass the IVR Turing test. Most notable
were calls which ended during the IVR Turing test or were
bridged only to be ended by the caller anyway. Only 363
were ended by the agent. In Table 3 we enumerate all other
ways a predicted “silent” call was ended. This error anal-
ysis elucidates the distribution of errors and notably what
kinds of audio calls were FP.
Most surprisingly, once we started programmatically an-
alyzing audio predicted as “silent” SPAM, regardless of
whether it was rejected or abandoned by the agent/caller,
98.6% {2100/2128, 229/233} of all predicted “silent” calls
were, in this post-attack test, pure digital silence!
There are many conditions under which digital silence is
correctly produced by the call-stack, for example at the be-
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Call Result Ended By Count
BRIDGED CALLER 1159
IVR ABANDON CALLER 547
BRIDGED AGENT 363
BRIDGE ABANDON CALLER 37
BRIDGE TIMEOUT APP 13
NO ELIGIBLE AGENTS APP 4
BRIDGE TIMEOUT CALLER 2
BRIDGE ABANDON AGENT 1
NO ELIGIBLE AGENTS CALLER 1
BRIDGE OUT OF SERVICE APP 1
Table 3. Reasons 2,128 “silent” calls were ended
ginning of HAM and some SPAM calls, during transfers or
right before a ring tone. Our error analysis illuminated the
fact that digital silence needed to have been better consid-
ered when labeling call segments. Had we recognized the
prevalence and interplay with “dead air” silence, we would
have labeled calls with mixtures differently, at a finer reso-
lution or factored out any digital silence from positive “dead
air” training segments.
This shift in the distribution of audio features between
the training and test phases versus running “in the wild”,
over time, raises questions about the steady-state efficacy
of the classifier and the need to keep the model up to date
in this adversarial match. These questions are common in
machine learning practice, i.e. when an algorithm is trained
in a lab setting without seeing the full breadth of data from
the production system, carefully formulated questions must
be asked and exhausted to ensure that models continue to
perform satisfactorily.
8 Future Work
In addition to the practical machine learning matters and
keeping the SPAM classifiers regularly updated, there are a
number of interesting algorithmic avenues for future work.
These include various neural network alternatives to non-
negative matrix factorization (NMF) [19] as well as fine-
tuned, state of art image classification models [31]. Fine-
tuning is the process of a trained model’s architecture and
weights as a starting point, freezing lower layers and train-
ing on our smaller “silent” spectrograms dataset. Adver-
sarial issues aside, these techniques have the potential to
alleviate the need for an interactive IVR Turing test in pro-
duction.
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